We show how probabilities can be treated as truth values in suitable sheaf topoi. The scheme developed in this paper is very general and applies to both classical and quantum physics. On the quantum side, the results are a natural extension of our existing work on a topos approach to quantum theory. Earlier results on the representation of arbitrary quantum states are complemented with a purely logical perspective.
Introduction
In a long series of papers, we and our collaborators have shown how quantum theory can be re-expressed as a type of 'classical physics' in the topos of presheaves (i.e., set-valued contravariant functors) on the partially-ordered set all commutative von Neumann sub-algebras of the algebra of all bounded operators on the quantum-theory Hilbert space H [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10] . These ideas have been further developed by Caspers, Heunen, Landsman, Spitters, and Wolters in a way that emphasises the internal structure of the topos [14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19] . Flori has presented a topos formulation of consistent histories in [13] .
The reformulation of quantum theory presented in these articles is a radical departure from the usual Hilbert space formalism. All aspects of quantum theory-states and state space, physical quantities, the Born rule, etc.-find a new mathematical representation, which also provides the possibility of a novel conceptual understanding. In particular, an observer-independent, non-instrumentalist interpretation becomes possible. For this reason, we call the new formalism 'neo-realist'.
Of course, many open questions remain. This article deals with aspects of probability as it shows up in both classical and quantum physics. As we will see, in both cases the usual probabilistic description can be absorbed into the logical framework supplied by topos theory.
1
The interpretation of probability theory has been discussed endlessly after the Renaissance endorsed it as a respectable subject for study. In longevity, the subject shares the peristalithic nature of debates about the conceptual meaning of quantum theory. Every physicist even mildly interested in philosophical questions will have heard about the range of different, incompatible viewpoints about probability: frequentist vs. Bayesian vs. propensity; objective vs. subjective probabilities; classical vs. quantum probabilities; epistemic (lack-of-knowledge) vs. irreducible probabilities; and a bewildering range of combinations of those.
We cannot hope to solve this debate here, but some useful remarks cane made from the viewpoint of physics. While most scientists lean naturally towards the relative-frequency/frequentist view on probability, this interpretation is limited because it cannot be used to assign a probability to the outcome of a single experiment.
2 By definition, the frequentist interpretation requires a large ensemble of similar systems on which an experiment is performed, or a large number of repetitions of the experiment on a single system.
A particular challenge is posed by those physical situations in which a frequentist interpretation cannot apply, even in principle. For example, if the whole universe is regarded as a single entity, as in cosmology, then clearly there are no multiple copies of the system. Moreover, the instrumentalist 1 As a side remark, we do not see quantum theory fundamentally as some kind of generalised probability theory. Such a viewpoint is almost invariably based on an operational view of physics and, worse, usually comes with a very unclear ontology of both probabilities themselves and the objects or processes to which they apply.
2 It is always interesting to reflect on what a weather forecaster really means when he or she says "There is 80% chance of snow tomorrow". concept of an 'experiment' performed on the entire universe is meaningless, since there is no external observer or agent who could perform such an experiment. This renders problematic both quantum cosmology and stochastic classical cosmology unless probabilities can be understood in non-instrumentalist terms. This argument applies also to subsystems of the universe provided they are sufficiently large and unique to make impossible the preparation of an ensemble of similar systems, or repetitions of an experiment on the same system.
Of course, in most of science there is a valid instrumentalist view in which the world is divided into a system, or ensemble of systems, and an observer. The system, or ensemble, shows probabilistic behaviour when an observer performs experiments on it. In the ensuing two-level ontology the system and the observer have very different conceptual status. Frequentist views of probability typically lead to such a dualism. A Bayesian view, in which probabilities are primarily states of knowledge or evidence, also presupposes a divide between system and observer and is based on an operational way of thinking about physical systems.
Such an operational view does not readily extend to quantum cosmology. 3 Hence, it is desirable to have a (more) realist formulation of quantum theory-or, potentially, more general theories-that could apply meaningfully to the whole universe. This desire to avoid the two-level ontology of operational/instrumentalist approaches is one of the motivations for the topos approach to the formulation of physical theories.
In our previous work it was shown in detail how pure quantum states and propositions are represented in the topos formalism and how truth values can be assigned to all propositions, without any reference to observers, measurements or other instrumentalist concepts. In fact, for pure quantum states, probabilities are replaced by truth values which are given by the structure of the topos itself. For the specific presheaf topoi used in our reformulation of quantum theory, a truth value is a lower set in the set V(H) (which is partially ordered under inclusion) of commutative subalgebras of the algebra, B(H), of all bounded operators on H. We only consider non-trivial, commutative von Neumann subalgebras V ⊂ B(H) that contain the identity operator. Each V ∈ V(H) can be seen as providing a classical perspective on the quantum system, with smaller commutative subalgebras giving a more 'coarse-grained' perspective than bigger ones.
A truth-value is therefore a collection of classical perspectives from which a given proposition is true. The fact that a truth value is a lower set in V(H) expresses the idea that once a proposition is 'true from the classical perspective V ', upon coarse-graining to smaller subalgebras V ′ ⊂ V , the proposition should stay true. The elements 4 V ∈ V(H) are also called contexts or, by mathematicians, stages of truth. It is easy to see that there are uncountably many possible truth values if dim(H) > 1 (compare this with the uncountably many probabilities in the interval [0, 1] .)
The treatment of pure states in the topos approach makes it unnecessary to speak of probabilities in any fundamental way. However, at first sight mixed states cannot be treated similarly. Since we aim at a formalism that can be interpreted in a (neo-)realist way, it seems most appropriate to regard probabilities as objective. More specifically, we lean towards an interpretation of probabilities as propensities. Since the probabilities associated with pure quantum states are absorbed into the logical structure given by the topos, we aspire to find a 'logical reformulation' for the probabilities associated with mixed states as well. As we will see, this necessitates an extension of the topos used so far for quantum theory. Probabilities are thereby built into the mathematical structures in an intrinsic manner. They are tied up with the internal logic of the topos and do not show up as external entities to be introduced when speaking about experiments.
We finally remark that all constructions shown here work for arbitrary von Neumann algebras 5 and arbitrary states, normal or non-normal. The more general proofs need no extra effort, though interpretational subtleties relating to non-normal states may arise. For simplicity and clarity of presentation, we use here only B(H) as the algebra of physical quantities of a quantum system and pure or mixed (i.e., normal) states.
The Topos Approach and Mixed States

Some basic definitions
There are several articles giving an introduction to the topos approach to quantum theory [9, 10, 12] and only a few ingredients are sketched here. We assume some familiarity with basic aspects of category and topos theory and 4 Strictly speaking, V(H) is a category whose objects are the commutative sub-algebras V . It is therefore more accurate to write V ∈ Ob(V(H)), rather than V ∈ V(H), and this we did in our earlier papers. However, here, for the sake of simplicity, we use the latter notation. 5 For some results, the algebra must not have a type I 2 -summand.
of functional analysis.
A key feature of the topos approach is the existence for each quantum system of an object that is functionally analogous to the state space of a classical system. This 'quantum state space', Σ, is a presheaf (i.e., a setvalued, contravariant functor) on the poset V(H) of abelian subalgebras of B(H), the algebra of physical quantities (or observables) of the quantum system. The collection of all such functors is a topos, denoted Sets
The poset V(H) and object Σ are known respectively as the context category and spectral presheaf.
Definition 2.1
The spectral presheaf, Σ, is defined over the context category, V(H), as follows:
(i) On objects V ∈ V(H), Σ V is the Gel'fand spectrum of the commutative von Neumann algebra V .
for λ ∈ Σ V . Here λ| V ′ denotes the restriction to V ′ of the spectral element λ ∈ Σ V . A sub-object (i.e., sub-presheaf) S is said to be clopen if S V is a clopen set in Σ V for all V ∈ V(H). The clopen sub-objects of Σ form a complete Heyting algebra (Theorem 2.5 in [6] ), denoted Sub cl (Σ).
Propositions in physics are usually of the form "A ε ∆", which in classical physics would read "the physical quantity A has a value, and that value lies in the (Borel) set ∆ ⊆ R of real numbers". Using the spectral theorem for selfadjoint operators, a proposition "A ε ∆" is represented in quantum theory by the spectral projectorÊ[A ε ∆]. It was shown in [6] that there is a map δ : P(H) → Sub cl (Σ), called 'daseinisation of projection operators', which sends each projection operatorP to a clopen sub-object δ(P ). In this way, a proposition "A ε ∆" is represented by the clopen sub-object δ(Ê[A ε ∆]) of Σ. This is analogous to classical physics where propositions are represented by (measurable) subsets of the classical state space.
The sub-object δ(P ) is constructed in a two-step process. First, one defines, for all V ∈ V(H),
which gives the 'best' approximation toP from above by a projector in the lattice, P(V ), of projection operators in the context V . The association
Definition 2.2 The outer presheaf, O, is defined as follows :
The second step uses the existence of a monic arrow, ι : O → P cl Σ, from O to the clopen power object, P cl Σ, of Σ [6] . This sub-object, P cl Σ, of the power object P Σ has the property that its global elements are clopen subobjects of Σ, whereas the global elements of P Σ are arbitrary sub-objects [6] . The construction of ι exploits the fact that for any commutative von Neumann algebra V , there is an isomorphism of complete Boolean algebras
between the projections in V and the clopen subsets of the Gel'fand spectrum, Σ V , of V . Given a projectionP ∈ P(V ), we define 4) and given a clopen subset S ⊆ Σ V , we definê
Thus locally, i.e., in each context V , we can switch between clopen subsets and projections.
Applying this to the family δ(P ) V , V ∈ V(H), of projectors, gives a family S δ(P ) V ⊆ Σ V , V ∈ V(H), of clopen subsets. This family of clopen subsets forms a clopen sub-object, denoted δ(P ), of Σ. Equivalently, the global element δ(P ) : 1 → O defined by (2.2) gives rise via ι : O → P cl Σ to a global element 1 → O → P cl Σ of P cl Σ, and hence to the clopen sub-object δ(P ).
Given a (normalised) vector state |ψ , we now form
This clopen sub-object is the topos representative of the pure state |ψ : we call w |ψ the pseudo-state associated with |ψ .
To each vector state |ψ ∈ H and physical proposition "A ε ∆" there corresponds the 'topos truth value' ν A ε ∆; |ψ ∈ ΓΩ defined at each stage V ∈ V(H) as,
We also write
for any projection operatorP on H.
This truth value, which is a sieve on V , can be understood as the 'degree' to which the sub-object w |ψ that represents the pure state is contained in the sub-object δ(Ê[A ε ∆]) that represents the proposition. This degree is simply the collection of all those contexts V ∈ V(H) such that w
The problem of mixed states
A very interesting (and important) question is how mixed states should be treated in this topos formalism. In its basic form, a mixed state is just a collection of vectors and 'weights', { |ψ 1 , |ψ 2 , . . . , |ψ N ; r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r N }, where N i=1 r i = 1 (we allow N = ∞). In standard quantum theory, the assumption that the quantum probabilities are stochastically independent from the 'weights' r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r N , leads via elementary probability arguments to the familiar definition of the associated density matrix as ρ := N i=1 r i |ψ i ψ i | and hence to the familiar expressions in which, for example, tr(ρÂ) replaces ψ|Â |ψ .
The important challenge is to find an analogue for ρ of the truth value in (2.7) for vector states |ψ , and in such a way that density matrices are separated by this expression. Of course, the vector |ψ in (2.7) can be replaced with ρ to give the sieve on V
but this is not adequate for our needs as it does not separate density matrices.
For example, let H be a three-dimensional Hilbert space with a chosen basis, and let ρ = diag( , 0) be two density matrices that are diagonal with respect to this basis. Then tr(ρP ) = 1 if and only if tr(ρP ) = 1 if and only ifP P 1 +P 2 , whereP 1 ,P 2 are the projections onto the rays determined by the first two basis vectors. In other words, ρ andρ have the same support, namelyP 1 +P 2 , and the topos truth value ν A ε ∆; ρ ∈ ΓΩ (given by the family ν A ε ∆; ρ (V ), V ∈ V(H), of sieves defined above) depends only on the supports, not on the actual weights, in ρ andρ.
As pointed out in [3] , there exists a one-parameter family of valuations defined for all V ∈ V(H) as
where r ∈ (0, 1]. (One could allow r = 0, but clearly, the condition then is trivially fulfilled and the valuation ν(−; −) 0 gives the truth value 'totally true', represented by the maximal sieve at each stage, for all states ρ and all propositions "A ε ∆".) The authors of [3] could find no use for these rmodified 'truth' values. However, it transpires that this family of valuations does separate density matrices, which is very suggestive of how to proceed.
Indeed, the main result of this paper is to show how the one-parameter family in (2.10) can be regarded as a single valuation in a particular extension of the topos Sets
V(H)
op . By this means we will achieve a completely toposinternal description of arbitrary (normal) quantum states ρ.
At this point we remark that there is another topos perspective on density matrices that at first sight appears to be very different from the one above. One of us (AD) has shown how each density matrix, ρ, gives rise to a 'probability' (pre-)measure, µ ρ , on Sub cl (Σ) [11] . This function
whereP S V is the projection operator in P(V ) that corresponds to the component S V of the clopen sub-object S at stage V . Here, [0, 1] denotes the presheaf of [0, 1]-valued, nowhere-increasing functions on the poset/category V(H). It can readily be checked that this family of measures separates density matrices.
Conversely, [0, 1] -valued probability measures on the spectral presheaf Σ can be defined abstractly, with the clopen sub-objects playing the role of measurable subsets. Provided the Hilbert space H has at least dimension three, from each such measure, µ, one can construct a unique quantum statẽ ρ µ : B(H) → C, such that µρ µ = µ. 6 The existence of such measures is in accord with our general slogan that "Quantum physics is equivalent to classical physics in the topos Sets
The construction in (2.11) can be applied to a (normalised) vector state |ψ , to give
at all stages V . In particular, for the sub-object S A ε ∆ of Σ associated with the spectral projectorÊ(A ε ∆) we get
Thus, for each state |ψ , a proposition "A ε ∆" is associated with two, quite different, mathematical entities:
(i) the Heyting-algebra valued topos truth value ν A ε ∆; |ψ ∈ ΓΩ defined in (2.7) as
for all V ∈ V(H); and
The purpose of the present paper is to study the relation between these two entities, and thereby to see if there is a topos-logic representation of the general, density-matrix measure, µ ρ in (2.11). Thus the challenge is to relate the probability measure µ ρ : Sub cl (Σ) → Γ[0, 1] to a topos truth value and hence to relate probability to intuitionistic logic. It is clear that the definition in (2.9) is not adequate as, unlike the measures µ ρ , it fails to separate density matrices.
As we shall see, the one-parameter family of valuations r → ν A ε ∆; ρ r ∈ ΓΩ defined in (2.10) plays a key role. However, the incorporation of this family into a topos framework requires an extension of the original quantum topos Sets
op . We will motivate this by first considering a topos perspective on classical probability theory.
We conclude this section with a technical remark. Namely, instead of talking about presheaves over the context category V(H), which is a poset, we can equivalently talk about sheaves if V(H) is equipped with the (lower) Alexandroff topology in which the open sets are the lower sets in V(H). Then, by a standard result 7 we have In what follows we will move freely between the language of presheaves and that of sheaves-which of the two is being used should be clear from the context.
A Topos Representation for Probabilities
The usual description of probabilities is by numbers in the interval [0, 1], equipped with the total order inherited from R. In order to absorb probabilities into the logic of a topos, our goal now is to find a topos, τ , such
where Ω τ is the truth object in τ . A natural way of doing this is to look for a topological space, X, whose open sets correspond bijectively with the numbers between 0 and 1.
Since the global elements of the sub-object classifier Ω τ are the truth values available in the topos τ , equation (3.1) means that probabilities will correspond bijectively with truth values in the topos.
A straightforward idea is to use suitable lower sets in the unit interval [0, 1]. These lower sets are required to form a topology, so the collection of lower sets must be closed under arbitrary unions and finite intersections. The intervals of the form (0, r), where 0 ≤ r ≤ 1, form a topology. Here (0, 0) = ∅. The maximal element is (0, 1), so our topological space X actually is the interval (0, 1) (and not [0, 1]). When regarding (0, 1) as a topological space with the topology given by the sets of the form (0, r), 0 ≤ r ≤ 1, we denote it as (0, 1) L . We define a bijection
Note also that intervals of the form (0, r] would not work: they are not closed under arbitrary unions. Take for example all intervals (0, r i ] such that r i < r 0 for some fixed
It may seem odd that a probability r ∈ [0, 1] is represented by the (open) set (0, r), which does not contain r, but this is not problematic. In the following, we will not interpret (0, r) as the collection of all probabilities between 0 and r, but as an open set, which corresponds to a truth value in a sheaf topos. This truth value, given by the structure of the topos, corresponds to the probability r. Now, a key idea in topos theory is that any topological space, X, should be replaced with the topos, Sh(X), of sheaves over X. Furthermore, a standard result is that there is an isomorphism of Heyting algebras.
It becomes clear that the topos we are seeking is Sh((0, 1) L ). We will simplify the notation Ω
We denote the isomorphism as σ :
Its concrete form will be discussed below.
It is clear that, for all stages
We remark that instead of describing stages as (0, r) ∈ O((0, 1) L ), we can also think of r ∈ [0, 1] by the isomorphism (3.2).
We now define a key map ℓ that takes a probability p ∈ [0, 1] into a global section of Ω (0, 1) , that is, a truth value in the topos. Roughly speaking, the idea is that p is mapped to the open set (0, p), which is a truth value in the sheaf topos. In fact, the map ℓ that we will define is nothing but the composition σ • β of the set isomorphisms β in (3.2) and σ in (3.4).
Concretely, we define for all p ∈ [0, 1] and all stages (0, r) ∈ O((0, 1) L ) the following sieve on (0, r):
where, by definition, (0, 0) = ∅. Thus we have
Here, we used the bijection
, which of course is implied by equation (3.2).
4 The Construction of Truth Objects
The topos truth value (2.7) for a vector state |ψ can be viewed in two ways. The first employs the pseudo-state w |ψ := δ( |ψ ψ| ) ∈ Sub cl (Σ) where, in the notation of local set theory, we have
where the right hand side is well-defined since both w |ψ and δ(Ê[A ε ∆]) are clopen sub-objects of the spectral presheaf Σ.
Our goal is to find a family of 'truth objects', T |ψ , |ψ ∈ H, with the property that the topos truth value in (4.1) can be expressed alternatively as
We note that for (4.2) to be meaningful, T |ψ must be a sub-object of the presheaf P cl Σ.
In our earlier work on truth objects we constructed the quantities 9 org T |ψ , |ψ ∈ H, defined by
for all V ∈ V(H). It can readily be checked that (4.3) defines a sub-object of O. With the aid of the monic arrow ι : O → P cl Σ this gives a sub-object of P cl Σ to which (4.2) applies. 8 In local set theory, to any pair, S 1 , S 2 of sub-objects of a third object A, there is associated an element of ΓΩ, denoted [[ S 1 ⊂ S 2 ]], which measures the 'extent' to which it is true that S 1 is a sub-object of S 2 . In our case,
9 The 'org' is short for 'original'.
For discussing daseinised sub-objects of Σ like δ(Ê[A ε ∆]) the simple definition in (4.3) is sufficient. However, the situation changes if we want to consider more general sub-objects of Σ. Specifically, we want to define T |ψ in such a way that
is well-defined for any clopen sub-object, S, of Σ. This is necessary to fulfil our desire to relate topos truth values with measures on Sub cl (Σ). Clopen sub-objects of the form δ(Ê[A ε ∆]) have very special properties whereas our measures are defined on arbitrary clopen sub-objects of Σ. This necessitates a new definition of the truth objects T |ψ , |ψ ∈ H.
Evidently, clopen sub-objects of the spectral presheaf Σ are of particular interest as the analogues of measurable subsets of a classical state space S. More precisely, as in (2.11), each quantum state ρ determines a (Γ[0, 1] -valued) 'probability measure', µ ρ , on Σ, with the clopen sub-objects playing the role of measurable subsets; conversely, each probability measure on Sub cl (Σ) determines a unique quantum state. The proof relies on Gleason's theorem which shows that a quantum state is determined by the values it takes on projections. As we shall see, clopen sub-objects have components which correspond to projections, hence Gleason's theorem is applicable.
It is very desirable to be able to express all clopen sub-objects of Σ in terms of projection operators as these are the mathematical entities that have the most direct physical meaning in quantum physics and they are also relatively easy to manipulate.
As mentioned earlier, there is a monic arrow ι : O → P cl Σ and, therefore, any global element of O leads to a clopen sub-object of Σ. However, ι is not surjective and hence not all clopen sub-objects can be obtained in this way. The remaining sub-objects can be recovered using the, so-called, hyperelements of O that were introduced in [6] . This is an intermediate step towards realising our main goal, which is to find some object X in the topos that (i) can be defined purely in terms of projection operators; and (ii) is such that
We start by recalling that a global element of O is a family of elementŝ
In other words
A hyper-element of O is a generalisation of this concept. Specifically, a hyper-element is a family of elementsγ
We denote the set of all hyper-elements of O as Hyp(O).
The importance of hyper-elements comes from the following results which are proved in the Appendix.
1. There is a bijection
The inverse is
There is a bijection
It follows from the above that there is a bijection Proof. We have shown above that there is a bijective correspondence
Now for any object A a fundamental property of the power object, P A, is that Γ(P A) ≃ Sub(A). It follows from (4.14) that
At this point it is worth stating the well-known specific form of a power object in a topos of presheaves. Specifically: Definition 4.1 The power object P A of any presheaf A over V(H) is the presheaf given by (i) On objects V ∈ V(H), for all V ∈ V(H), P A V is defined as
where A |↓V is the restriction of the presheaf A to the smaller poset ↓ V ⊂ V(H), and analogously for Ω |↓V .
Here, n V ′ |↓V is the obvious restriction of the natural transformation n V to a natural transformation A |↓V ′ → Ω |↓V ′ .
We now prove the 'internal' analogue of the 'external' isomorphism Sub(O) ≃ Sub cl (Σ) in (4.14), namely:
Theorem 4.2 In the presheaf topos Sets
V(H)
op , there is an isomorphism
between the power objects P O and P cl Σ.
Proof.
It follows from (4.19) that an equivalent definition of P A is
for all V ∈ V(H). In this form, the presheaf maps in (4.20) are just the restriction of an object in Sub(A |↓V ) to ↓V ′ for all V ′ ⊆ V .
In particular, the Definition 4.1 (and equation (4.22)) applies to the power object, P O, of the outer presheaf O. The presheaf P cl Σ is defined in the same way except only clopen sub-objects of Σ are used. Thus, for all V ∈ V(H), we have
and
However, the bijection f : Sub(O) → Sub cl (Σ) in (4.14) clearly gives rise to a series of 'local' bijections
for all V ∈ V(H). The inverse is
These local maps are consistent with subspace inclusions i V ′ V : V ′ ⊆ V , i.e., they are the components of two (mutually inverse) natural transformations
Therefore, P O can be identified with the clopen power object P cl Σ.
We note that we we also have the bijections
Generalised truth objects
We first recall from (2.8) that the topos truth value in ΓΩ for a proposition represented by a projection operatorP is
for all V ∈ V(H). The expression in (4.30) can be usefully rewritten as
and, similarly, the 'original' truth object given in (4.3) can be rewritten as as
only has meaning if org T |ψ can be regarded a sub-object of P cl Σ, which it can by virtue of the monic arrow O → P cl Σ. However, in order to give meaning to the valuations [[ S ∈ T |ψ ]] for an arbitrary clopen sub-object, S of Σ we need to find a new expression for a truth object that does not 'factor' through the monic O → P cl Σ.
Using the isomorphism P O ≃ P cl Σ proved in Proposition 4.2, the new truth object can be regarded as a sub-object of P O. The concrete form of P O can be written in several equivalent ways using the local isomorphisms
Specifically, we define the new truth object T |ψ ⊂ P O as
V ′ are just the obvious restrictions from ↓V to ↓V ′ .
We note that, 11 using (4.34),
with equivalent expressions using (4.35) and (4.36). In particular,
The topos truth value in (2.7) can now be rewritten as
However, we can now also give meaning to the valuation [[ S ∈ T |ψ ]] for any clopen subset, S of Σ, not just those of the form δ(P ) for some projection operatorP on H.
The truth objects
The truth objects will now be generalised by considering the one-parameter family ν −; ρ r of valuations given by (2.10). For each density matrix, ρ, and r ∈ [0, 1] we will associate a corresponding truth object T ρ,r .
Note that, strictly speaking, if r < 1 then T ρ,r should not be called a 'truth' object: its global elements represent propositions that are only true with probability at least r in the state ρ. Although T |ψ ,1 turns out to be the truth object defined in (4.36), in general, for 0 < r < 1, we will get collections of propositions that are not totally true in the state |ψ .
12
The idea is to generalise condition (4.36), which played the key role in the definition of T |ψ . This condition determines which projections can appear as components of global elements of the truth object T |ψ . Thus this condition implements the requirement that a sub-object S ⊆ Σ which represents a proposition that is totally true in the state |ψ must have components S V that are 'true from the local perspective V ', for all local perspectives (i.e., contexts) V ∈ V(H). Each such component S V corresponds to a projectionP S V in V and represents a proposition that is available in the context 11 We also note that org T |ψ ∈ ΓT |ψ . 12 We remark that mathematically, it is no problem to include the probability r = 0, but from an interpretational viewpoint, one may want to exclude it, since global sections of the truth object T ρ,0 represent propositions that are true with probability at least 0, and every proposition fulfils this trivially.
V . This local proposition is (locally) true in the state |ψ if and only if |ψ ψ| P S V holds for the projections.
We can now generalise this condition. If ρ |ψ = |ψ ψ| is the density matrix corresponding to the pure state |ψ then |ψ ψ| P ⇐⇒ tr(ρ |ψ P ) = 1. (4.40)
Instead of demanding tr(ρ |ψ P ) = 1, we now just require tr(ρ |ψ P ) ≥ r, for a given r ∈ [0, 1]. (For r = 0, the condition is trivially true.) We can also extend the idea to general mixed states ρ and demand that tr(ρP ) ≥ r.
The generalised truth object T ρ,r is defined using T |ψ in (4.36) as an analogue. Thus
V ′ are defined as the obvious restriction of sub-objects from ↓V to ↓V ′ . Clearly, T ρ,r is a sub-object of the power object P O . We note that is the family of clopen sub-objects S of Σ ↓V such that for all V ′ ∈↓V we have tr(ρP S V ′ ) ≥ r 2 . But since r 1 < r 2 ,
This result expresses the fact that the collection of sub-objects that represent propositions which are true with probability at least r 1 is bigger than the collection of sub-objects which represents propositions that are true with probability at least r 2 > r 1 . However, the generalised truth objects T ρ,r 1 , T ρ,r 2 are only collections of sub-objects locally (in V ). Globally they are presheaves whose global elements are sub-objects of Σ that represent propositions which are true with probability at least r 1 , resp. r 2 , in the state ρ. Note that the result T ρ,r 2 ⊆ T ρ,r 1 ⊆ P O implies that ΓT ρ,r 2 ⊆ ΓT ρ,r 1 .
It can now be shown that
for all r ∈ [0, 1] where, as in (2.10), for all stages V ∈ V(H), we define
There is no (obvious) analogue for ν A ε ∆; ρ r of the pseudo-state option in (4.1) for ν A ε ∆; |ψ and hence, in what follows, we will focus on the use of truth objects.
A topos perspective on classical probability theory
Before we proceed to develop a topos version of quantum probabilities, we first sketch a topos perspective on classical probability theory. This is interesting in its own right and also provides guidance for the quantum case later on.
Thus, suppose X is a space with a probability measure µ : Sub(X) → [0, 1]. Here, Sub(X) denotes the µ-measurable subsets of X. Then we wish to describe this situation using the topos Sh((0, 1) L ) discussed in Section 3. As a first step we define the sheaf X as theétale bundle over (0, 1) L with constant stalk X over each (0, r) ∈ O((0, 1) L ); in terms of the usual notation, X := ∆X. Similarly, for any measurable subset S ⊆ X of X we define S := ∆S. Thus there is a map 
Note that, here, r labels the stages, while in (4.41) r is fixed. If r 1 < r 2 , the presheaf maps
are defined in the obvious (trivial) way:
It is easy to show that this defines a sheaf over the topological space (0, 1) L . Now, S is a sub-object of X, and T µ is sub-object of P X. 13 Therefore, the valuation [[ S ∈ T µ ]] is well-defined as an element of ΓΩ (0,1) . Specifically, at each stage r ∈ [0, 1] we have , where S ⊆ X. Of course, in the present case this is rather trivial, but it gives insight into how to proceed in the quantum theory.
Actually, the classical result has some interest in its own right. Essentially we have a new interpretation of classical probability in which the results are expressed in terms of truth values in the sheaf topos Sh((0, 1) L ). This suggests a 'realist' (or 'neo-realist') interpretation of probability theory that could replace the conventional (for a scientist) instrumentalist interpretation in terms of relative frequencies of measurements.
We also remark that the truth values, given by ΓΩ (0,1) , form a Heyting algebra, which is one aspect of the intuitionistic logic of the topos. One well-known realist view of probability is the propensity theory in which a probability is viewed as the propensity, or tendency, or potentiality, of the associated event to occur. Thus the results above might be used to give a precise mathematical definition of propensities in terms of the Heyting algebra ΓΩ (0,1) , though it should be remarked that the role of the Heyting algebra structure is not entirely clear at the moment.
Using the map ℓ : [0, 1] → ΓΩ (0,1) defined in (3.6), we obtain
This diagram will provide an important analogue in the following discussion of the quantum theory.
A measure µ is usually taken to be σ-additive, that is, for any countable family (S i ) i∈N of pairwise disjoint, measurable subsets of X, we have
(4.58)
We reformulate this property slightly. LetS 0 := S 0 , and for each i > 0, define recursivelyS
Then (S i ) i∈N is a countable increasing family of measurable subsets of X. Now σ-additivity can be expressed as
that is, µ preserves countable joins (suprema).
The map ℓ : [0, 1] → ΓΩ (0,1) , defined in (3.9), also preserves joins, as can be seen easily: let (p i ) i∈I be a family of real numbers in the unit interval [0, 1] (the family need not be countable). Then
Since joins are defined stage-wise in ΓΩ (0,1) , we obtain ℓ(
Hence, the composite map ℓ • µ : Sub(X) → ΓΩ (0,1) preserves countable joins of increasing families (S i ) i∈N of measurable subsets, that is,
(4.64)
Note that ℓ • µ corresponds to the upper-right path through the diagram (4.57). Since the diagram commutes, the left-lower path, i.e., the map ξ µ •∆, also preserves such joins,
This is the logical reformulation of σ-additivity of the measure µ. for all V ∈ V(H). Then µ ρ (∅) = γ 0 and µ ρ (Σ) = γ 1 , which suggests the sections γ 0 and γ 1 are to be associated respectively with ⊥ Ω and ⊤ Ω in ΓΩ .
Next define a map j :
. This is a sieve on V since once γ(V ′ ) becomes 'true' (i.e., equal to 1) it remains so because γ is a nowhere-increasing function. Note that if γ r denotes the 'constant' section with value r then
Note also that, to each density matrix ρ and projection operatorP , there corresponds a global element γP ,ρ ∈ Γ[0, 1] defined by Returning to the definition (5.2) of j : Γ[0, 1] → ΓΩ, we now make the critical observation that there is a natural one-parameter family of maps
for all stages V ∈ V(H). Thus (5.2) is just the special case j = j 1 .
It is important to note that the parameter r in (5.7) has been chosen to lie in (0, 1] rather than [0, 1] . This is because, for all γ ∈ Γ[0, 1] , for r = 0 we have
In particular, even if γ = 0 we would still assign the truth value 'totally true'.
To interpret this, suppose we choose ∆ to lie completely outside the spectrum ofÂ. ThenÊ[A ε ∆] =0, the null projection representing the trivially false proposition in standard quantum theory.Ê[A ε ∆] =0 implies that δ(Ê[A ε ∆]) V =0 for all V , which corresponds to the empty subobject ∅ ∈ Sub cl (Σ), the representative of the trivially false proposition in the topos approach to quantum theory. For any quantum state ρ, the corresponding probability measure µ ρ : Sub cl (Σ) → Γ[0, 1] will map the empty subobject ∅ to the global element γ0 ,ρ = 0, the global element that is constantly 0 (see (2.11) and (5.5); for details, see [11] ). From (5.7), we obtain
for all r > 0, while for r = 0,
The latter means that we assign 'totally true' to the trivially false proposition, which we want to avoid by excluding r = 0. Note that only for r = 0, we get 'totally true', for all r > 0, we obtain 'totally false'. It is a matter of interpretation if one wants to allow that even the trivially false proposition can be true with probability 0 (since any proposition is true with at least probability 0), or if the proposition that conventionally is interpreted as trivially false must be totally false. In the latter case, one must exclude the case r = 0, as we will do here. This has no bearing on our results.
For later reference, we note that in quantum theory, γP ,ρ (V ) := tr(ρ δ(P ) V ) (see (5.5)) and hence
so that, in particular,
for all V ∈ V(H).
Now we come to an important result.
Proof. Suppose there are γ 1 and γ 2 in Γ[0, 1] such that γ 1 = γ 2 . Then there exists V 0 ∈ V(H) such that γ 1 (V 0 ) = γ 2 (V 0 ). Without loss of generality we can assume that γ 1 (V 0 ) > γ 2 (V 0 ). Now consider
On the other hand, since
and hence the family of maps {j r : Γ[0, 1] → ΓΩ | r ∈ (0, 1]} is separating.
The map
As shown above, the one-parameter family of maps j r :
separates the members of Γ[0, 1] and, therefore, density matrices. Our goal now is to combine this parameterised family to form a single map from Γ[0, 1] to ΓΩ τ where Ω τ is the sub-object classifier of some new topos τ .
The first step in this direction is the result gained from combining (3.2) and (3.4), giving the isomorphism
which, as discussed in Section 4.4, enables a topos-logic interpretation to be given to classical probability theory. The key results are summarised in the commutative diagram in (4.57).
We remark that, on the face of it, (5.16) is an isomorphism of sets, not Heyting algebras. By the isomorphism (3.2), we could regard [0, 1] as a Heyting algebra, since O((0, 1 L )) is a Heyting algebra (as the open sets of any topological space form a Heyting algebra). Since (3.4) is a Heyting algebra isomorphism, too, we could see (5.16) as an isomorphism of (complete) Heyting algebras.
Yet, there is little to be gained from this: the measure µ : Sub(X) → [0, 1] is not a Heyting algebra morphism, so in the commutative diagram (4.57), we have some morphisms which are Heyting algebra morphisms, while others are not. We consider the fact that [0, 1] can be seen as a Heyting algebra, and ℓ as a Heyting algebra isomorphism, as coincidental. It is more important that ℓ is a set isomorphism, and is obviously order-preserving. This means that ℓ represents probabilities faithfully as truth values in our sheaf topos. Moreover, there are no other truth values apart from those corresponding with probabilities.
Yet, there is aspect of ℓ being a morphism of complete Heyting algebras that we do use: namely, the preservation of joins which plays a key role in the logical reformulation of the σ-additivity of a measure µ, as described at the end of subsection 4.4.
In the quantum case, we can give the set of 'generalised probabilities', i.e., the codomain Γ[0, 1] of our probability measures, the structure of a partially ordered set in the obvious way: let γ 1 , γ 2 ∈ Γ[0, 1] , then
Let us now consider again the one-parameter family of topos truth values
for all stages V ∈ V(H). Here, r ∈ (0, 1] and, as shown in (5.11),
We recall also the result from classical probability theory in (4.51) Obviously, we are now interested in the sheaf topos Sh(V(H) A × (0, 1) L ), where we can define ℓ :
That this is a sieve on V, r ∈ O(V(H) A × (0, 1) L ) follows because γ is a nowhere-increasing function. In particular, we have
In this context it is important to note that the map ℓ :
clearly separates the elements of Γ[0, 1] , as follows from an obvious analogue of the proof of Theorem 5.1. For suppose there are γ 1 and γ 2 such that γ 1 = γ 2 . Then there exists V 0 ∈ V(H) such that γ 1 (V 0 ) = γ 2 (V 0 ). Without loss of generality we can assume that
26) It follows that ℓ(γ 2 ) = ℓ(γ 1 ), as claimed. This means that the map ℓ :
We show that ℓ preserves joins: let (γ i ) i∈I ⊂ Γ[0, 1] be a family of global elements of [0, 1] , then 
(5.31)
The truth object T ρ
Our intention is that (5.24) will be the truth value of the proposition "A ε ∆" when the quantum state is the density matrix ρ. The topos in question is Sh(V(H) A × (0, 1) L ) and, for notational convenience, we will denote a sheaf on V(H) A × (0, 1) L by a symbol A to distinguish it from the symbol B for a sheaf on V(H) A (or, equivalently, a presheaf over V(H)). A key step will be to define a truth object T ρ from which (5.24) follows as the correct truth value.
The first step is to construct certain physically important sheaves over V(H) A × (0, 1) L . To this end define the projection maps p 1 :
A key step is to identify the state object and quantity-value object in this new topos Sh(V(H) A × (0, 1) L ). We will make the simplest assumption that there is no r-dependence in the state object: indeed, from a physical perspective it is hard to see where such a dependence could come from. Therefore, we define the state object in Sh(
In the topos Sh(V(H) A ) a quantum proposition associated with the projectorP is represented by the clopen sub-object, δ(P ), of Σ. In the light of (5.33) it is then natural to assume that the sub-object that represents the quantum proposition is just δ(P ) := p * 1 δ(P ).
(5.34) 14 Strictly speaking, the stages V, r =↓V × (0, r) give just a basis of the topology on V(H) A × (0, 1) L , so we would have to consider arbitrary unions of these sets to describe all stages. This clearly poses no difficulty.
The quantity-value object must then be defined as
where R is the quantity-value object in Sh(V(H) A ). This guarantees that the Sh(V(H) A )-representation of a physical quantity by an arrowȂ : Σ → R will translate into a representation in Sh(V(H) A × (0, 1) L ) by an arrow from Σ to R.
All the objects in Sh(V(H) A × (0, 1) L ) defined above are obtained by a trivial pull-back from the corresponding objects in Sh(V(H) A ). The critical, non-trivial, object is the truth object T ρ . One anticipates that this will be derived in some way from the one-parameter family, r → T ρ,r , r ∈ (0, 1] defined in (4.41).
In fact, the obvious choice works. Namely, define T ρ as
This equation shows that T ρ is a sub-object of P Σ, and δ(P ) is a sub-
which, as anticipated, is just (5.24). In summary, the truth value associated with the proposition"A ε ∆" in the quantum state ρ is
The equation (5.38) is the main result of our paper. The critical feature of the truth value, (5.38), in the topos Sh(V(H) A × (0, 1) L ) is that it separates density matrices, in marked contrast to the more elementary truth value, (2.9), in the topos Sh(V(H)).
The analogy with classical probability theory
The analogy with classical probability is quite striking. This, we recall, is summarised by the commutative diagram
Our claim is that there is a precise quantum analogue of this, namely the commutative diagram
The only map in (5.40) that has not been defined already is
Motivated by the construction (4.54) in the classical case, we define
for all sub-objects S of Σ. We now observe that (5.37) can be rewritten as
where we have used that fact that δ(P ) := p * 1 δ(P ).
and so it follows that
It is easy to check that this equation actually applies to any clopen sub-object of Σ, not just those of the form δ(P ). Thus (5.40) is indeed a commutative diagram.
The equation (5.45 ) is the precise statement of the relationship between the topos truth value, [[ p *
If we consider a normal quantum state ρ (i.e., a state that corresponds to a density matrix, that is, a convex combination of vector states), then we obtain a measure µ ρ : Sub cl (Σ) → Γ[0, 1] that is σ-additive in the following sense. Let (S i ) i∈N be a countable, increasing family of clopen subobjects, then
This is equivalent to Corollary IV.2 in [11] . Compare this formula with (4.60): the corresponding result for classical, σ-additive measures.
Together with the fact that ℓ preserves joins, as proven in subsection 5.2, this implies that
preserves countable joins of increasing families (S i ) i∈N of clopen subobjects. Since, by the commutativity of the diagram (5.40),
This is the logical reformulation of normality (i.e., σ-additivity) of the quantum state ρ. 
The Born rule and its logical reformulation
As was shown in [11] (and as can be seen from (2.11)), the smallest value
of this global element is nothing but the usual expectation value of the projectionÊ[A ε ∆] in the state ρ, that is
In this sense, the topos approach reproduces the Born rule (for projections) and rephrases it in terms of probability measures on the spectral presheaf Σ. 15 In standard quantum theory, the expectation value tr(ρÊ[A ε ∆]) is interpreted as the probability that upon measurement of the physical quantity A in the state ρ, the measurement outcome will lie in the Borel set ∆ ⊆ R. This is an instrumentalist interpretation that crucially depends on concepts of measurement and observation.
We can now map the global element µ ρ (δ(Ê[A ε ∆])) of [0, 1] by ℓ to a truth value in the sheaf topos Sh(V(H) A × (0, 1) L ). As observed earlier, this map is injective, which means that we faithfully capture the information contained in
mathematician Lukasiewicz [23] after whose work a number of philosophers of science have made a variety of proposals.
Much of this work involved three-valued logic, the most famous proponent of which was probably Reichenbach [20] . One problem commonly faced by such schemes is an uncertainty of how to define the logical connectives.
Lukasiewicz logic that is infinite-valued has also been studied, and this includes logics whose truth values lie in [0, 1] . This leads naturally to the subject of fuzzy logic and fuzzy set theory. We refer the reader to the very useful review by Pykacz [22] which introduces the historical background to these ideas. Another attempt to relate probability to logic is that of Carnap whose work, like much else, has largely disappeared into the hazy past [21] .
Our topos approach is different to any of the existing schemes and, we would claim, is better motivated and underpinned with very powerful mathematical machinery. We have no problem defining logical connectives as this structure is given uniquely by the theory. That is, the propositional logic is given by the Heyting algebra Sub cl (Σ), and the possible truth values belong to the Heyting algebra ΓΩ.
In the topos theory, truth values are not only multi-valued, they are also contextual in a way that is deeply tied to the underlying quantum theory. That explains why our probability measures are not simply [0, 1]-valued but are associated with arrows from Sub cl (Σ) to (global elements of) the presheaf [0, 1] .
In the present paper we make the strong claim that standard, classical probability theory can be faithfully represented by the global elements of the sub-object classifier, Ω (0,1) , in the topos, Sh((0, 1) L ), of sheaves on the topological space (0, 1) L , whose open sets correspond bijectively to probabilities in the interval [0, 1] . This tight link between classical probability measures and Heyting algebras is captured precisely in the commutative map diagram in (4.57). This approach to probability theory allows for a new type of non-instrumentalist interpretation that might be particularly appropriate in 'propensity' schemes.
What, to us, is rather striking is that the same can be said about the interpretation of probability in quantum theory. The relevant commutative diagram here is (5.40) which shows how our existing topos quantum theory, which uses the topos Sh(V(H) A ), can be combined with our suggested topos approach to probability, which uses the topos Sh((0, 1) L ), to give a new topos quantum scheme which involves sheaves in the topos Sh(V(H) A × (0, 1) L ).
As we have seen, in this scheme, results of quantum theory be coded in either (i) the topos probability measures µ ρ : Sub cl (Σ) → [0, 1] (which reinforces our slogan "Quantum physics is equivalent to classical physics in the appropriate topos"); or (ii) the topos truth values, ν A ε ∆; ρ , defined in (5.38), which take their values in the Heyting algebra ΓΩ Sh(V(H) A ×(0,1) L ) .
Thus, in both classical and quantum physics, probability can be faithfully interpreted using truth values in sheaf topoi with an intuitionistic logic.
Appendix
We prove some technical results here.
First, we recall the definition in (2.3) of the isomorphism α V : P(V ) = O V → Cl(Σ V ) between the projections in V and the clopen subsets of the Gel'fand spectrum, Σ V , of V . A basic property of this assignment is the existence of the commutative squares:
and for all V ∈ V(H).
Proof. First, let γ ∈ Hyp(O). In order for k(γ) to be a (clopen) sub-object of Σ, it is necessary and sufficient that, for all V ′ , V ∈ V(H) with i V ′ V : V ′ ⊆ V , we have
However, the commutative square in (7.1) gives
for allα ∈ O V and for all V, V ′ ∈ V(H) with i V ′ V : V ′ ⊆ V . Because γ is a hyper-element of O we have δ(γ V ) V ′ γ V ′ , and hence
which proves (7.4), as required. Thus the map k in (7.3) defines a clopen sub-object of Σ.
Conversely, define a map j : Sub cl (Σ) → Hyp(O) by
for all S ∈ Sub cl (Σ) and for all V ∈ V(H). To check that the right hand side of (7.8) is indeed a hyper-element of O, first note that the commutative square (7.2) gives
However, since S is a sub-object of Σ, we have Σ(i V ′ V )(S V ) ⊆ S V ′ , and so, from (7.9), for all V ′ ⊆ V , for all sub-objects A of O.
Proof. The first step is to show that the right hand side of (7.12) is a hyper-element of O. To this end we note that, for any V ′ ⊆ V , for all V ∈ V(H). To show that the right hand side of (7.15) is a sub-object of the outer presheaf, O, we first note that, for all V ′ ⊆ V ,
Now, ifα γ V in P(V ) then δ(α) V ′ δ(γ V ) V ′ in P(V ′ ) and, because γ is a hyper-element, δ(γ V ) V ′ γ V ′ . Therefore, 
